policy should better protect country names and has urged the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to formulate amendments that might be incorporated into a revised version of the UDRP. 6 WIPO is, in fact, currently conducting a public consultation on a series of potential amendments that would expand the scope of the UDRP to explicitly include personal names, geographic designations, and trade names. 7 Another vocal group of UDRP critics has also emerged, concerned that the system promotes forum shopping and is systemically biased in favor of trademark holders, who are invariably the complainants in domain name disputes. 8 These concerns, which were expressed during the initial drafting of the UDRP, 9 have grown louder as the policy has been put into practice and data begins to emerge. 10 The right of complainants to pick which arbitration provider handles their dispute has been the target of particularly vociferous criticism. 11 Although ICANN initially accredited three arbitration providers in order to foster a competitive environment, many commentators anticipated that complainants would engage in forum shopping by rationally selecting arbitration providers who tended to rule in their favor. Those fears were realized almost immediately. The two ICANN-accredited providers with the most favorable outcomes for complainants (WIPO and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)) quickly captured the lion's share of the caseload at the expense of eResolution, the least complainant-friendly of the major ICANN-accredited providers. 12 Furthermore, forum shopping has continued to increase over time. In February 2001, for example, only three new cases were launched with eResolution, compared with 183 cases with WIPO and 96 cases with the NAF. 13 Although the existence of forum shopping has become common knowledge among those involved with the UDRP, a critical question remains unanswered. While there is clearly an incentive for arbitration providers to curry favor with potential complainants in order to attract future cases, how, if at all, do they do so?
The more obvious sources of provider differentiation have only occurred on a fairly small scale. For example, price competition, one clear method of distinguishing providers, has thus far been rather limited. Among the three main providers, 14 the cost for a single domain, single panelist case starts from a low of US$950 (NAF) to a high of US$1500 11 Ibid. 12 Rough Justice, supra. Louis Touton, ICANN's general counsel has also expressed concern over forum shopping, noting that "Forum shopping is clearly a problem and if it is occurring it suggests that justice is being bought and sold." Oscar S. Cisneros, What to do with Domain Disputes?, WIRED News, 13 November 2000 (online at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,39992,00.html) (last visited: 12 August 2001). 13 List of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (online at: http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-list.htm) (last visited: 12 August 2001). 14 The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, which received accreditation as an ICANN dispute resolution provider in May 2000, has thus far been a non-factor in the UDRP. As of July 7, 2001, the provider had only been involved in a total of 22 cases. Given the small number, the CPR data is excluded from most analysis in this report. (WIPO) . 15 When the legal costs associated with a UDRP action are factored into the equation, the difference in filing fees is relatively unimportant.
Other differences, such as panelist rosters and language capabilities, are even less pronounced. Although initially there were considerable differences in panelist roster composition, the rosters of the three providers now look increasingly alike. WIPO's roster was once characterized primarily as being comprised of a global group of trademark attorneys and law professors, 16 while NAF's roster was described as retired U.S. judges, 17 and eResolution's roster was perceived as international law professors. 18 Today, as a growing number of panelists are cross-listed with multiple providers, it is more difficult to distinguish between provider panelist rosters. Moreover, NAF and eResolution have increased the international component of their panelist rosters, narrowing the gap with WIPO and improving their ability to address cases in foreign languages and with non-U.S. parties.
Marketing techniques clearly illustrate one area of differentiation between providers, with the NAF adopting a far more aggressive approach than the other providers in the marketing of its services. Unlike both WIPO and eResolution, the NAF regularly distributes press releases heralding recent decisions. The releases have taken on a distinctly pro-complainant tone in recent months. The author, who is on the NAF's media distribution list, received eleven press releases from May through August 2001, ten of which promoted a complainant win. Featuring headlines such as "Arbitrator Delivers The providers' supplemental rules also provide a point of difference. For example, each provider takes a slightly different approach to respondents' response rights. WIPO does not provide any supplemental rules on responses. It relies instead on the ICANN rules that outline that responses must be filed within twenty days 20 and that extensions may be granted either in exceptional cases or if the parties mutually agree to an extension. 21 EResolution similarly relies on the ICANN rules for respondent submissions, but includes an additional provision that grants respondents five calendar days to correct any deficiencies in their submission once so notified by the provider. 22 The NAF, meanwhile, contains the most detailed and onerous requirements for an extension. Supplemental Rule 6(a) states that:
Paragraph 5(d) of the Rules provides that the Respondent may request additional time to submit a Response, or may be given additional time if the parties stipulate to an extension and the Forum approves. Any request by the Respondent for an extension or any joint request by the parties for an extension shall:
(i) be submitted after the parties have first conferred with each other to see if they could reach an agreement concerning the requested extension; (ii) be submitted in writing to the Forum and the parties within the time for the Response to be submitted; (iii) state the exceptional circumstances warranting the request for an extension; (iv) state the length of the extension being requested (no more than twenty (20) additional days); and (v) be accompanied by an extension fee of $100. 23 The NAF's supplemental rule, which was added in May 2000, clearly places an additional burden on a respondent seeking an extension and has been characterized by some commentators as "worrisome" and "extremely biased." 24 At a minimum, the supplemental rule distinguishes NAF from its competitors.
Since most of the differentiating factors are somewhat benign, the most prominent difference between providers remains case outcome. Simply put, complainants win more frequently with WIPO and the NAF than with eResolution. The statistical data, which has remained consistent since the introduction of the UDRP, shows that complainants win 82.2% of the time with the WIPO, 82.9% of the time with the NAF, but only 63.4% of the time with eResolution. 25 The NAF is not alone on the issue of caseload allocation bias as WIPO's track record also raises concerns. A review of all WIPO panelists that have decided five or more single panel cases (and thus have a track record) finds that there are 104 such panelists, all of whom have a complainant win percentage that is higher than at least two respondentfriendly WIPO panelists who have never been selected for sole panelist duty. In fact, of the 104 panelists, only one has a complainant winning percentage that is under 50%.
Following a brief historical review of the development of the UDRP and an introduction to its rules in part two of this study, part three examines these numbers in greater detail.
The study concludes in part four with recommendations for changes to the UDRP designed to instill greater fairness and confidence in the process.
PART TWO -THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UDRP
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), headed by the late Jon Postel, initially managed the Domain Name System (DNS). 31 Growing demand from businesses and individuals, however, together with the increasing administrative burden of maintaining the system resulted in changes to the system in 1992. 32 That year, the U.S. government granted Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) the exclusive right to register three generic top-level domain names (gTLDs) --dot-com, dot-net, and dot-org. As part of the registration right, which was initially scheduled to last for five years, NSI was charged with managerial responsibility for the maintenance of the DNS. 33 With the first agreement set to expire in 1997, the U.S. Department of Commerce granted NSI a two-year extension. In return, NSI agreed to create a Shared Registry System that would allow competing companies to register dot-com, dot-org, and dot-net domains. 34 Moreover, once a competitive registrar system was established, NSI agreed to apply for accreditation through the same process as other registrars, thereby relinquishing its competitive advantage over the domain name registry market. 35 NSI did not have a formal dispute resolution mechanism to address domain name disputes when it took over the registry responsibilities from IANA. 36 As disputes began to mount, NSI recognized the need for a dispute resolution policy. Early efforts, however, became a source of frustration for trademark owners and domain name registrants alike since the dispute policies focused primarily on protecting NSI from liability. 37
Prior to 1995, NSI maintained that domain name registrants bore the responsibility for ensuring that their domain name did not infringe upon any trademark rights but, otherwise, did not provide a formal dispute resolution policy. 38 As the number of domain name lawsuits mushroomed and concerns over the stability of the DNS increased, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, issued a draft discussion paper in February 1998 titled "A Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses", better known as the "Green Paper." 48 The paper's stated goals were privatization and international participation in the DNS as well as increased competition in registry services. 49 Following the Green Paper consultation, a final report entitled "Management of Internet Names and Addresses" or the "White Paper" was published by the NTIA in June 1998. 50
A key concern expressed during the Green Paper public consultations was the fear that the U.S. would seek to impose U.S. trademark law on the Internet for the resolution of domain name disputes. 51
In an attempt to alleviate this concern, the White Paper committed to a WIPO-led, international process to develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark and domain name disputes. 52 The UDRP differs from the NSI dispute resolution policy in three material respects: (1) trademark owners are no longer able to place a hold on domain names during the disputeresolution process;
(2) trademark owners can only invoke a UDRP proceedings if the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith; and (3) the administrative dispute resolution proceeding is mandatory for all domain name registrants. 61 Registrants are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding conducted by a dispute-resolution service provider approved by ICANN where a complainant asserts that:
(1) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
To succeed, the complainant must prove that all three elements are present. 62 The policy provides some guidance as to what constitutes evidence of bad faith registration and use of a domain name. 63 They include:
(1) circumstances indicating that the registrant has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring it to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark, or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of "out-of-pocket" costs directly related to the domain name; 64 or
(2) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that a pattern of such conduct is evidenced; 65 or
(3) the domain name has been registered primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; 66 or (4) the domain name has been registered primarily for commercial gain through creating a likelihood of confusion. 67
A respondent can demonstrate rights or a legitimate interest in a domain name by presenting evidence that:
(1) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent used or prepared to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(2) the respondent has been commonly known by the domain name, even if no trademark or service mark rights have been acquired;
(3) legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent to divert consumers or tarnish the trademark or service mark for commercial gain, is being made. 68 A proceeding commences when the complainant submits a complaint to an ICANN approved dispute resolution service provider of their choosing. The complainant must specify whether the dispute is to be decided by a single-member or three-member panel.
The fee for a single-member panel is paid entirely by the complainant. 69 In the event that a three-member panel is requested, the complainant must submit names and contacts of three candidates from a roster of any ICANN-approved provider to serve as one of the panelists. 70
Following a compliance review, the provider forwards the complaint to the respondent. 71
The respondent must submit a response to the provider within 20 days of commencement of the proceeding. 72 If no response is submitted, the panel decides the case based solely upon the evidence furnished by the complainant. 73 Even if the complainant has requested a single member panel, the respondent has the right to have the dispute decided by a three-member panel instead. 74 If either the complainant or respondent requests a three-member panel, the respondent must provide the names and contact details of three candidates to serve as one of the panelists, which can also be drawn from any ICANN-approved provider's roster. 75 Where the complainant has elected to have the dispute decided by a single-member panel and the respondent requests a three-member panel, the respondent is required to pay one-half of the applicable fee for a three-member panel. 76 If the complainant requests a single-member panel and the respondent does not object, the provider alone assigns a single panelist from its roster to the case. If a three-member panel is selected, one panelist is selected from the list of candidates provided by each of the complainant and the respondent. 77 The third panelist is appointed by the provider from a list of five candidates submitted by the provider to the parties, the selection from among the five being "made in a manner that reasonably balances the preferences of both
Parties". 78 The typical approach is to allow each party to strike out up to two names from the list of five. 79 ICANN Policy provides that panelists should be "impartial and independent" and must disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubt as to the panelist's 72 Ibid. section 5 (a • 3059 (99%) of the cases were rendered in English. The remaining decisions were rendered in French (8 cases) and Spanish (27 cases). Complainants won all but two of the non-English language cases.
• 309 panelists were involved in the 3094 cases.
• 27 panelists participated exclusively in three-member panels. These panelists were involved in 62 cases, of which the complainant won 34 (55%) and the respondent won 28 (45%).
• 32 dissents were issued in three-member panel cases. Of these, 15 were in cases won by the complainant, 15 were in cases won by the respondent, and two were split decisions.
• 25 panelists rendered decisions for two or more providers. These multi-provider panelists were involved in 489 cases (16% of all UDRP decisions), of which complainants won 381 (78%).
II. Key Findings i. The Dramatic Effect of Three-Member Panels
Although little attention was accorded to the possible differences between single and three-member panels during the public discussion of the UDRP, by far the most Third, and most importantly, the three-member panel completely alters the panelist selection process. In a single panel case, the arbitration provider is exclusively responsible for allocating the case to a panelist. Conversely, in a three-member panel Although the benefit of broadening the panelist field was apparent to many, the importance of removing much of the provider's responsibility for case allocation was less apparent since all providers maintain that case allocation occurs on a random basis. If that were the case, panelist selection would not be a matter for concern. A close examination of the data suggests, however, that single panelist selection may be anything but random.
ii.
Suggestions of Bias within UDRP Caseload Allocation
As noted above, the UDRP Rules refer only briefly to the issue of single panel panelist selection. Article 6 (b) specifies that providers shall select a panelist from their roster 87 ICANN Policy, Article 6 (d).
with the cost to be paid entirely by the complainant. 88 The lack of transparency on issues such as panelist allocation is particularly worrisome since the data suggests that there is a significant difference in outcome when panelists are allocated exclusively by the provider in a single panelist case and when both parties influence the composition of the panel, as in a three-member panelist case. Furthermore, with a growing number of panelists cross-listed on two or more provider rosters, differences in outcomes between providers cannot be easily attributed to the different composition of the provider rosters. 88 ICANN Rules, Article 6 (b). 89 eResolution Supplemental Rules, Article 8 (i). 90 A review of eResolution's case allocation confirms that this is the typical practice. Through July 7, 2001, there were 60 eResolution single panel cases involving parties from different jurisdictions. In 55 of those cases, the single panelist was a resident of neither the complainant's nor the respondent's jurisdiction.
Although not explicitly provided in its rules, it would appear that a similar policy is followed by WIPO. A review of its caseload of single panel cases involving parties from different jurisdictions yielded 784 cases of which 736 involved a single panelist who was not resident of either the complainant's nor the respondent's jurisdiction. This study suggests that although each of these proposals for reform may have a positive effect on the problematic aspects of the UDRP, they ultimately will not address the root of the problem. Rather than focusing on provider selection as a means of solving the forum shopping issue, ICANN must turn its attention to panelist selection. If providers continue to maintain exclusive and unchecked authority over the selection of panelists in 90% of all UDRP cases, no reforms to the rules nor to how a provider is selected will remove the potential for bias in panelist allocation.
It is submitted that the solution to the forum shopping issue, and with it the concerns about bias and inconsistency within the UDRP, is surprisingly simple --all contested UDRP actions should involve three-member panels. Establishing the three-member panel as the default would remove most provider influence over panelist selection and ensure better quality decisions by forcing panelists to justify their reasoning to their colleagues on the panel. As with the current system, both parties would play a role in selecting one panelist, who may be part of any ICANN-accredited providers' roster, while the provider would select the third panelist from among a list that both parties have reviewed and accepted.
The dramatic difference in single versus three-member panel outcomes should not be viewed as shifting the balance toward domain name registrants, but rather as shifting the balance toward greater fairness. Although analysts have argued over what the "right" complainant win percentage ought to be, the 60% complainant win rate in three-member panels indicates that the best considered decisions place the percentage much lower than current overall rate of 82%. Unlike the current system, the complainant would be required to cover the full cost of the three-member panel. Although this requirement will double the cost of a UDRP action for many complainants, the cost will remain low in comparison with traditional litigation.
Moreover, the fact that complainants already select a three-member panel more frequently than do respondents indicates that concern over the quality of decisions is currently an issue of concern for both trademark holders and domain name registrants. Forcing complainants to shoulder the full cost of a three-member panel should not be regarded as providing respondents with a free ride. The costs inherent in launching or defending a UDRP action extend well beyond the provider fees -legal and administrative costs can be several times as much as the provider fee and the current rules do not contain any provision for costs. Accordingly, defending a UDRP action remains an expensive proposition for all registrants even if the requirement to contribute to the cost of a threemember panel is eliminated.
ii. Caseload Minimums and Maximums
Several additional smaller reforms may prove effective in conjunction with the adoption of the three-member panel as the standard approach. The establishment of caseload minimums and maximums would help ensure that this study's findings -huge caseloads assigned to a small number of panelists as well as the failure to select some panelists for dispute resolution duty -are eliminated.
If all contested UDRP cases featured three-member panels chosen by and large by the complainant and respondent, providers would be unable to ensure that panelists met either caseload minimums or maximums. However, providers will still play a role in naming the panel's third panelist as well as in respondent default cases that revert to a single panelist. Accordingly, it would be beneficial to create new limits that ensure that all panelists are afforded to the opportunity to preside over roughly equivalent number of cases and that no panelist gets "too many" cases. The minimum cases would likely be expressed by a raw number, perhaps no less than three cases per year. The maximum caseload would likely be expressed as a percentage, perhaps no more than three percent of a provider's total caseload.
Establishing these caseload minimums and maximums would reduce provider influence over panelist selection, increase the assurance of random case allocation, and enhance the public perception of the UDRP's fairness.
iii. New Quality Control Mechanisms
Although eResolution does not publicize the fact on its Web site, that arbitration provider engages in an annual quality control review of its panelists. 104 Last year, ten panelists were removed from its roster due to quality control problems such as unreasonable delays in the release of decisions or failures to abide by the ICANN Rules. 105 Similar quality control mechanisms should become standard at all ICANN-accredited providers. Complainants and respondents alike will agree that the quality of individual panelists varies greatly. While this is not unexpected, all providers should play an active role in seeking to ensure that only the best panelists participate in the UDRP. The annual reviews should be conducted in public, with solicitations of comments from the public and the public release of those persons removed from each provider's roster. 104 Email with eResolution representative, on file with the author.
105 Ibid.
iv. Greater Transparency
One the greatest challenges in conducting this study was the lack of readily available data. Although all UDRP cases are posted and freely available, case reports vary in quality since there is no standard approach. Moreover, the current search functionality on both the ICANN and provider sites lack the functionality necessary to search by panelist and panel type, two critical considerations.
As a result of this shortcoming, the author intends to post the data collected during this study on a publicly-available Web site (http://www.udrpinfo.com). In addition, the UDRP Publishing Protocol Project, hosted by the Cornell Law School, plans to support the development of greater reporting standards. 106 ICANN, in conjunction with the providers should make the availability of greater and more useful UDRP data a priority.
Increased transparency in the entire process, from panelist selection to decision-making process, will only enhance public confidence in the system.
CONCLUSIONS
The Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) Names Council is scheduled to conduct a review of the UDRP during the Fall 2001 with the results to be presented at the ICANN board meeting in November 2001. 107 Part two of this study, which reviewed the development of a domain name dispute resolution policy dating back to the initial NSI policies in the mid-1990s, illustrates that policies have changed with surprising regularity as practical experience identifies the need for reform.
ICANN must not shy away from reforming the domain name dispute resolution policy yet again.
This study provides compelling evidence that forum shopping has become an integral part of the UDRP and that the system may indeed be biased in favor of trademark holders. Both WIPO and the NAF, the two dominant ICANN-accredited arbitration providers, feature case allocation data that suggests that the panelist selection process is not random. Rather, it appears to be heavily biased toward ensuring that a majority of cases are steered toward complainant-friendly panelists.
Moreover, the data shows that there is a correlation between provider panelist selection and case outcome. When providers control who decides a case, as they do for all single panel cases, complainants win just over 83 percent of the time. As provider influence over panelists diminishes, as occurs in three-member panel cases, the complainant winning percentage drops to 60 percent.
The solution to the forum shopping and bias issues may be relatively simple -the adoption of the three-member panel as the default approach. When combined with protective measures such as caseload minimums and maximums, transparent quality control mechanisms, and greater accountability through standardized disclosure, the reforms would succeed in instilling greater confidence and fairness in the UDRP.
